Consequences of inflation phobia

updated: added the summation of the factors for a -1.5 deflation rate.

I’m sure most people have heard that increasing how much money is going around generally increases prices (and the opposite holds true). Economists have a formal method for explaining this phenomenon:

M * V = P * Y

The model’s variables are aggregates representing different aspects of the economy. M is how much money there is (though unclear as to what money is). V is Velocity which is s how quickly money is circulating, this variable can tell you quite a bit about the economy and confidence. P is the price level of the economy (Consumer price index is a proxy for consumer), and Y is the total output (Gross Domestic Product is a proxy).

You generally have to get it logged so you can work in growth rates which help tell you better where the economy is heading. So that gives:

m + v = p + y

To clarify, that means that if GDP grows by 10% then y would be 10%. Rearranging for the price level gives us:

m + v – y = p

Now it’s just a question of plugging the right numbers in to predict what inflation will be. Money velocity is expected to be dropping by about 2.5% because of broken financial institutions and lack of confidence in the economy. GDP growth rate in the Eurozone is up for debate but for the sake of argument let’s say its 2%. The ECB is unwilling to be expansionary (thanks to Germany’s hyperinflation phobia) so money growth seems to be about 3%.

3 – 2.5 – 2 = -1.5

So why is this bad? Because when people expect deflation, they end up waiting more (since they expect their money to buy more in the future). This means that economic activity decreases even further and sends the economy further down a depressionary spiral. This includes not only consumers but investors, since consumers won’t be spending, investors won’t find fruitful projects. This comes back in the form of less stuff and less employment. This is not to say that the marginal effect of a deflation movement from 1 to 0 is worse than one from 0 to -1, but generally speaking, the more deflation, the worse things will be. 

Money velocity and GDP can be affected by fiscal stimulus that is, government spending more money. You can also affect velocity by increasing confidence in the markets which makes people not hoard cash as much. But both of these seem unrealistic in the Eurozone with its lack of political union where everyone seems to be obsessed with austerity. An easier solution would be for the ECB to say we are going to increase how much money there is in the economy by 10%, since money is something they directly control this is very easy to do, just print more money, but that won’t even be necessary, as long as they say it out loud, investors and consumers will all know to expect inflation and will invest or spend in the economy.

A note: the expansionary monetary policy would also allow government debt to become more sustainable which makes the other options easier to do.

links 08/10/2012


When do economists agree?(fun)

Exponential Economist meets finite physicist(fun)

Bernake and student conversation(fun..ish)

What came first, the chicken or the egg? Empirical Evidence!(fun…ish)

What are the key functions of Asset management?

What is the price of going short volatility?

Bestiary of Economists!(fun)

The economics of video games(fun..ish)

Gravity and international finance

Foreign banks and financial development

Corporate governance in financial institutions

Too crooked to fail? (fun…ish)

With Mitt Romney having released his effective tax rate and it being below 15% there has been a debate about optimal capital taxation. Here’s a good academic paper on it, and a slightly more comprehensible article on it, there is also an unsmoothed graph presented after that article.


Want to be a crony?

Should we end the Fed?

Do Indie Video games have a competitive advantage?

Random economics knowledge bites:

Lecture on macro0-economics(includes stuff on optimal currency area)

Marginal Revolution Site for economics

Fed lectures series

How to protect depositors without bailing out the bankers!

The above is Laiki’s(Cypriot bank to be bailed out) balance sheet, which I pulled off their latest annual statement. I highlighted the assets which are safe in yellow, the assets which are risky in green and the “other” in blue.

I then highlighted the liabilities which we are trying to protect, the deposits, in yellow, and the liabilities which we don’t in want to safeguard in green. I then added those up in 3 categories of assets and 2 categories of liabilities the result is the column on the left in the picture below.

I then give all the safe/liquid assets to the good bank along with an optimistic portion of long-term which will be paid back. It is likely the majority of these are loans to Greeks which are unsafe and will probably not be paid back in full, so I assumed an 80% repayment rate, which might be optimistic, but the approach also works with less optimistic repayment rates, the difference being the good bank’s capital ratio, the capital ratio and the repayment rate are positively correlated.


Essentially all of the liquid assets are given to the good bank and all the illiquid ones to the bad bank (in practice this would include some headquarters to continue with their remaining operations). The biggest asset for Laiki is the “advances to customers” this will have to undergo special evaluation for the split between liquid and illiquid to occur. The most important aspect here is that the bad bank holds the equity of the good bank, note that this means that the capital ratio for the bad bank remains fixed no matter how many assets are given to the good bank, nevertheless the good bank should have a maximum amount of liquid assets to ensure safety.


The only liability the good bank needs to take on is the customer deposits since it is what we are trying to protect and it is what prevents us from allowing them to declare bankruptcy. Once the deposits have been secured, capitalism can work again.


Both the old Laiki equity and the good bank Laiki equity are given to the bad bank.

What this achieves:

1)      The Deposits are safe and danger of a bank run is eliminated

2)      Remaining debt that was never promised a government guarantee goes to the bad bank.

3)      The old Laiki (bad bank) is still relatively better capitalized but still responsible for the decisions they made. If they do become insolvent they can declare bankruptcy without interfering with customers deposits, this means they can now be treated as a normal company.

4)      It’s important to highlight that this approach is not complementary(though it can be) to a bailout but a substitute, which does guarantee that bankers will not be over or under punished but will bear the fruits of their actions.

In practice

The good bank will continue to work under the Laiki brand and continue its operations just like normal whilst the bad bank will be running in the background trying to properly manage its existing assets. It will still benefit from profitable activity from the good bank but will be treated like a normal company. No public money (excluding any administrative costs to make this plan work) has been used and stability has been restored. Over time the good bank can also engage in secondary market trading and that can still follow the shareholder’s wishes and should the good bank face a similar crisis that Laiki is facing then the process can be renewed with a new good bank and the old good bank transformed into a new bad bank.

A pre-requisite for this approach to work is that there are sufficient safe assets, and a minor risk this mechanism faces is that banks will no longer favour liquid assets as to not allow this mechanism to work and force a bailout. This is however an extreme scenario that would not occur with properly executed regulation.

This innovative approach has been very well received academically but has not been applied anywhere yet.

Shut up Romney, here’s why trickle down doesn’t work!

So you often hear right wingers advocate for cutting tax rates on the rich. Bush did this and so were born the “Bush Era” tax cuts. And now you have Romney advocating for the same thing if he is to be elected.

The logic they apply is probably not bad at all at face value. If you cut taxes on the rich then they will spend that money to create jobs by investing in society.

What it does miss however is one of the first things you read in an economics text books: a company will hire an employee if it can extract more value out of them than it has to pay them. So this means that the only thing that matters is how productive the employee is. The minimum wage creates a minimum level of productivity required so after a certain level of productivity is reached, then a company would hire. All of this is of course under the conditions that the markets the company is operating in are expanding or that it thinks it can steal market share with these new employees.

But maybe an employee isn’t productive the moment you hire them, but they have to take training and will learn on the job, so the company has to take a loss, and maybe the company can’t afford the loss(even though companies are sitting on record levels of cash in their bank accounts). And in some countries/states interning for free is illegal, so they can’t get rid of that loss or reduce their risk by evaluating candidates with on the job testing.

However companies can also borrow money, either from banks or by giving out bonds or whatever. And these days the cost of borrowing money is ridiculously low, a company should easily be able to find a 1% interest rate. But Romney is right, he will create jobs, it will just be the jobs that previously could not work because the company was not able to extract more than 1% value out of that employee. An example is someone who’s going rate at the job market was 70k but with the current interest rate they would only have been able to pay them 69.3k… a very rare occasion indeed, somehow the company could not afford to pay 700 dollars/pounds/whatever more, which would be much less with average incomes. So the jobs will ONLY be generated for cases where they can spare 69.3k but can not 70k, and these tax cuts are only for the richest, who are likely to have millions… so whats the probability that people with over 100k(in all likelihood, people who are millionaires) income, can’t afford to spare 700 dollars? not very high…

Does Basel III make sense?

In the past couple of decades the sung mantra for deregulation has been overwhelmingly dominant yet today light touch regulation is shown to increase volatility in growth. With a new era of regulation taking place, perhaps the single most globally important measure is BASEL.  Although BASEL II was never fully fulfilled in the US, BASEL III is now in line to be implemented it’s important to understand the risk management mechanics of this series of regulatory implementations. BASEL aims to recommend to banks how to be solvent by creating a system that evaluates risk based on leverage and the rating of assets. The innovations of  BASEL III is that it introduces a buffer conservation which restricts shareholder compensation if the equity level is too low and a counter cyclical buffer which is an attempt at creating a more dynamic capital requirement which increases if the credit to GDP ratio rises. This is a great step in making BASEL more dynamic but as long as arbitrary static figures exist within it it’s likely to not be efficient.

It’s a romanticised notion that this is actually a policy which would reduce risk by limiting the amount of exposure allowed. However this can also be seen as a transfer of liquidity risk. From a retail banks point of view, the liquidity risk is passed to the citizen as he can now borrow less. The static figures of capital requirements also assume an excessive amount of knowledge as to how many good investments are really available, relying excessively on a top down approach measuring style of how much banks should lend. Additionally limiting leverage based on risk weight actually reduces diversification because it encourages investment in low risk assets as the number of low risk assets has not increased, this reduction in diversification could increase risk in the long run. This system also allows for an excessive amount of leverage if too many low risk assets are used. In the worst case scenario fruitful investment will not be undertaken and in the best case scenario predatory lending will decrease, having imperfect knowledge means at least one of these will occur.

However having risk weights also encourages banks to want to pass on the risks to other bearers who might not be optimal holders. For example holding mortgage-backed securities today on a balance sheet is a very expensive endeavour which encourages the passing of this risk. BASEL could have been the culprit behind the reckless behavior that caused the financial crisis since it indirectly encouraged securitization because of its ability to skip over capital requirements. This goes contrary to an optimal framework because to reduce risk on securitized assets the optimal practice is to keep them with bearers who have the most information about them, and the longer the chain of risk selling, the more fragmented and scarce on information on the product becomes. A more thought out policy would take measures to ensure that the holders of the risk were not too far from the entity whose risk they are holding. A more bottom up approach such as giving regulators guidelines on systemic risk is a much more potent way of controlling it. To boost regulatory performance, there should be incentives such as bonuses based on low systemic risk measurements to ensure there are parties actively pursuing the interest of taxpayers.

Does the Volcker Rule fix finance?

One of the main governmental responses to the 2008 crisis was the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer protection act. This act includes changes such say “say on pay” which requires shareholder approval on executive compensation and empowering the SEC by allowing it to exercise judgment on proxy voting and protecting the customer by capping interchange fees in banks with over 10 billion in assets. However the most important part of this reform is likely to be the Volcker Rule.

Named after Paul Volcker, the Volcker Rule is essentially a reincarnation of the Glass Steagall act. This rule prohibits deposit taking institutions from directly engaging in proprietary trading or speculation, this is also done by the prohibition of over 3% ownership in any given hedge fund or private equity fund. One point of view is that this reduces the market risk of retail institutions and shifts it to the investment banks, the theoretical subsequent result being that there is less market-making and a less efficient system that disrupts allocation of capital throughout the economy. Before the rule, banks held securitized assets on their balance sheets for weeks which would put them at risk of swings in the products value. In practice however investment banks will now take a much more cautious approach as they would now be using borrowed money from the retail banks.

An example of what we should expect to see if more risk reduction is taking place is a more cautionary approach by investment banks. At the next booming period we will be able to juxtapose investment banks before and after the Volcker Rule. The norm so far has been to create securitized mortgages and hold in the bank’s balance sheets typically for a couple of weeks until they could be sold, this was the “warehouse” function of banks in the securitization process. If a more cautionary approach is taken, a reduction in the “warehouse” aspect of securitization will take place and there will be a greater incentive to directly link buyers and sellers beforehand. This could be an indication that the previous system was run on moral hazard of investment banks not bearing their own risks.

Although there are claimants that this rule will greatly cripple markets, by crippling access to liquid, if the investment opportunities are truly there, then other industries will be able to pick up the slack without putting as much risk on the consumer(lets not forget how much money companies are sitting on today). Without citizens bearing the risk it’s probable that risk-taking will be reduced and the dropping of standards would not occur without sufficient reason. This bearing of risk will likely result in a demand for greater transparency, the benefit will be a decline in cloudy activities, such as shadow banking.


The relativity of entrepreneurship types

Entrepreneurship takes three forms, these are productive, unproductive, and destructive. Some academics believe that the supply of entrepreneurs cannot be influenced by policy and the only thing that can be changed are the “rules of the game” which will change the mix of these three types of entrepreneurship, hopefully influencing entrepreneurs to be productive. Some of these types are fairly obvious whilst others might be surprising.

Productive entrepreneurship is fairly obvious, someone opening up a restaurant with fully vegetarian dishes is productive entrepreneurship. A good rule of thumb for identifying productive is if you can identify an unsaturated demand for it.

Unproductive entrepreneurship is entrepreneurship that doesn’t really benefit society but benefits individuals. An individual who trades with his own money through the stock market. Trading through the stock market doesn’t really add much value since for every dollar he makes, somebody else loses it, however price discovery and liquidity could be argued for but these are hardly productive activities. A clearer example is perhaps someone who buys a building and then rents the rooms, this literal rent seeking obviously doesn’t change much at all, it makes no difference who owns the property. The Law profession is also widely considered to be unproductive the majority of its activities result in mere transfers instead of value creation.

Destructive activities on the other hand could be for instance the selling of bad drugs(emphasis explained later) because people will die. Or a pyramid scheme, although it might seem that it’s just unproductive since the net result is a redistribution of money with people at the bottom losing their money, its unproductive because it could destroy confidence in the market and maybe hinder multi-level marketing companies.

This identification process can be tricky, for instance a libertarian might call a lawyer discovering a clause that allows a company to pay less taxes productive since he assumed the money is more productive in the company, whilst a communist might say that’s destructive since the state spends money for the benefit of all and this could affect the budget. Selling drugs would probably be considered by most to be a destructive form of entrepreneurship yet if the drugs don’t necessarily have violence or overdose associated with them, like in Amsterdam, its probably not destructive. This relativity puts a large emphasis on political parties representing the will of the people as to what productive is. This is especially important since evidence as to wether government can influence entrepreneurship is not very certain, however there is strong evidence that it can funnel it in the “right” direction.

Read more on these types here: Baumol_1990_